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Relativism
Sandra LaFave
The Issue
People often say things like:
These positions, and others like them, are forms of relativism. Relativism is the view that judgments about truth and falsity, good and bad, right and wrong are relative to the individual person or culture. Different people have different opinions about what’s true but no one can be said to be absolutely right or wrong; rather, everyone is correct. Relativism denies that there can be any objectivity in matters of truth or morality. Some terminology:
The Argument
for Relativism
Relativism is usually supported by the following argument: Premise1: Different individuals and cultures, at different times, hold widely varying and sometimes contradictory beliefs about what’s real, what’s true, and what’s moral. No truths or ethical rules are common to all individuals or cultures. Premise 2: Since everyone “comes from somewhere,” there is no possible “objective” standpoint (no “view from nowhere”). Premise3: What’s true and what’s moral depend solely on an individual’s or a society's perspective. Conclusion: Therefore, what is real, what is true, and what is moral vary from person to person and from culture to culture. There is no such thing as an objective “truth” or a “fact”. What is true for one person in one culture might be false for another person in a different culture (or even false for someone else in the same culture). What is moral for one person in one culture might be immoral for another person in a different culture, or even immoral for someone else in the same culture. Note the conclusion carefully: it is not simply restating the first premise. That premise says that people at different times and places have different beliefs about truth and morality. The conclusion says something much more surprising. The relativist conclusion is that what's actually true and false, moral or immoral, differs for different people or cultures: for example, the same statement might be simultaneously both true and false; the same act simultaneously both moral and immoral for different people. Analyzing the Argument When we decide whether or not to accept an argument — when we think critically about it — we ask at least the following three questions:
You can think of these questions as tests; if an argument fails one or more of these tests, the argument is unacceptable. Let’s assume the premises are clear enough; i.e., this argument passes the first test. Are the premises true, then?
Reasons to doubt Premise1 Certainly it's undeniable that certain specific moral standards vary from culture to culture. But suppose we make a distinction between specific moral rules and ultimate or fundamental moral principles. Do fundamental moral principles differ from culture to culture? Maybe not. Maybe people only disagree about how to implement the fundamental moral principles; but those fundamental principles are actually the same across cultures. For example, one society might say it's your moral duty to kill your parents when they reach the age of 50, on the theory that they'll be better off in the next life if they enter it while still able-bodied. Another society might say that, under ordinary circumstances (your parents are healthy, enjoying life, etc.), it's your moral duty not to kill them, so they may enjoy life as long as possible. The rules differ, but the fundamental principle is the same, namely, do the best you can by your parents. Utilitarianism — the ethical theory that says you should do what produces the greatest good of the greatest number — has been proposed as one of these “fundamental moral principles,” implemented in very different ways in different cultures, different circumstances. It's easy to think of contradictory ethical rules equally consistent with utilitarianism, depending on circumstances. For example, depending on circumstances, prohibiting birth control might maximize the general happiness; in other circumstances, requiring birth control might maximize general happiness. Can we say for certain, then, that no universal fundamental moral principles exist? On the contrary, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive scientists are concluding more and more that in fact some moral principles are common to every culture, for evolutionary reasons.
Premise2 Is it true that since everyone “comes from somewhere,” there is no possible “objective” standpoint (no “view from nowhere”) for humans? Most contemporary philosophers would agree that everybody does have a point of view, and that no one has perfect God-like objectivity. But so what? Does that imply that all beliefs are equally reasonable and that one person’s belief is necessarily as true as another’s? No. “There’s no view from nowhere” does not imply that “epistemologically, anything goes!” In other words, even if Premise2 is reasonable, the argument for relativism still fails the logic test. The relativist conclusion is simply too strong. Even if there’s no view from nowhere, it’s not necessarily the case that “anything goes” epistemologically and you can believe whatever you like and all beliefs are equally correct. For example, even if there’s no “view from nowhere,” my belief that “red means stop” is still a better belief than “red means go,” for practical (pragmatic) reasons. Pragmatist philosophers would point out that some beliefs, especially scientific ones are extremely useful as predictors; these beliefs work. For example, scientific beliefs about gravity and acceleration and mass, etc., correctly predict that people who jump off the Empire State Building will die. A person really can’t say, “Well, I don’t have to worry about that, because I don’t believe in scientific principles.” (Phoebe on Friends talks this way; that’s why she’s funny.)
Reasons to doubt Premise 3 Is it true that what’s true and what’s moral depend solely on an individual’s or a society's perspective? There are really two questions here:
The answer to the first question is clearly “no.” Believing that something is so doesn’t necessarily make it so. But if the answer to the first question is “no”, the answer to the second must also be “no.” Moral belief is just one kind of belief. Believing doesn’t make it so, in morality any more than in any other sphere. So even if beliefs about morality differ from culture to culture (which they probably don’t), it does not necessarily follow that what is moral or immoral differs from culture to culture. The Trap of Dogmatic Relativism Dogmatic relativism claims that epistemological relativism is true. But if epistemological relativism is true, there’s no such thing as a “true” statement; there are only opinions. So dogmatic relativism is self-contradictory (inconsistent); if it’s true, it can’t be true! The relativist believes on the one hand that nothing is true, and on the other hand, that it’s true that nothing is true. In other words, if all statements are just somebody’s opinion (and “who’s to say?” applies), then the relativist’s own relativism is just the relativist’s opinion (and “who’s to say?” applies)!
Relativism, Absolutism, and Dogmatism You might still be tempted to accept relativism because you think it’s the only alternative to moral absolutism. Moral absolutism is the view that there is but one eternally true and valid moral code, which applies with rigid impartiality to all people in all cultures at all times and places. But, you might think, moral absolutism is surely wrong and dangerous; it leads to intolerance and dogmatism. People who think they know “the truth” about morality tend to be insensitive to alternative ways. Moral absolutists have perpetrated horrible persecutions, wars, and genocide on other people and cultures. Therefore, we should be relativists in the name of tolerance. There are no moral absolutes, but everyone should be respectful and tolerant of other people and other cultures. This argument is very popular, but flawed. Four critiques are important: The argument presupposes that there are only two options:
absolutism and relativism. This is a false
dilemma fallacy. Relativism is not the only alternative to absolutism.
One could reject absolutism and still say that some behaviors are morally
better or worse. Most contemporary moral theories, e.g., utilitarianism
and virtue ethics, are neither absolutist nor relativist.
The argument is self-contradictory. “Everyone should be respectful
and tolerant” is a moral maxim the relativist intends to apply to all
people in all cultures; yet at the same time the relativist denies that
any moral maxims apply to all people in all cultures! The relativist,
to be consistent, must say that respect and tolerance are required only if one’s culture requires them.
When the relativist criticizes absolutism for causing harm,
the relativist seems to be presupposing an objective inter-cultural notion
of harm. But this is exactly the sort of idea a relativist cannot presuppose, since according to relativism,
what counts as harm for one culture might not count as harm for another.
Relativism actually encourages the very ethnocentrism good-hearted
relativists are trying to combat. People who have internalized the message
of relativism rightly conclude that other cultures are hermetically sealed.
You often hear people of good will say things like “You just can’t understand
people of my sex/people of my race/people of my sexual orientation, etc.,
if you haven’t had our particular experience of oppression, if you’re
not one of us.” But if you can’t really learn anything about other cultures, why
try? Why not be lazy and give up?
Non-Dogmatic
Relativism Non-dogmatic relativism – Peter’s position in Who’s To Say? – is the view that a better case can be made for relativism than for any other epistemological view, although relativism is not a doctrine he’d adhere to dogmatically. As he says, it’s more “a denial that a view or position can be established” (30) regarding knowledge. Non-dogmatic relativism maintains, for example, that it is reasonable to believe that storms are caused by spirits and gods because that belief is just as reasonable as believing the usual scientific meteorological account. Neither the animist belief system nor the scientific one is objectively “better” so neither belief system should be “privileged” – i.e., regarded as more prestigious or more worthy of belief. Peter’s motives are laudable and underlie some forms of “multicultural education”. Peter intends non-dogmatic relativism to be “humane and liberating”, so people can avoid the misunderstandings that lead to prejudice, quarrels, and wars. Peter favors an attitude of openness to other cultures, because he thinks that “If you explore, with charity and sympathy, a view radically different from your own, … you find there are no good reasons to prefer your own view to that one – or that one to yours.” (31) Note that Peter is saying something rather subtle. He’s not saying merely that we should respect other people and other cultures, or that it’s reasonable for so-called “primitive” people to believe in spirits and gods, since they don’t have access to science. He wants to say something much stronger: that if you fully understand the world of a so-called “primitive” person and also fully understand the world of an ordinary Western scientifically-minded person, you won’t find the Western scientific point of view more reasonable to believe. Rather, you’ll find both points of view equally reasonable to believe. Peter doesn’t think the scientific outlook is “really” any better at all. So if Peter is successful in his arguments, the rational scientific outlook is really undermined. Peter says, language communities or cultures are like boats which float (maintain logical consistency) separately from one another. Each boat’s sailors constantly repair (reason about) the boat during the journey. Rationality (fixing the boat) happens only once you’re on board, so, according to Peter, rationality itself is relative. The repairs that need to be made on one boat aren’t necessarily the same as on another. Each boat is thus “cognitively isolated” (43). You can, however, change your world view, and your conception of rationality, by attentively, sympathetically visiting another boat, or changing boats. Once you change boats (“convert”), you enter another cognitive “world” just as rational as the one you just left. Peter gives five main arguments for non-dogmatic relativism, which I list, along with counter-arguments, below. No single one of his arguments is conclusive, he grants. (He’s easy that way; he’ll agree with your criticisms too.) However, he says the arguments taken together establish the case for non-dogmatic relativism almost irresistibly – though not irresistibly, since he’s not going to be dogmatic about it. Presumably if you disagree with him, and he appreciated your point of view, he’d see that non-dogmatic relativism doesn’t really work (for you). Argument 1 P1: People who think they know the truth tend to be insensitive to alternative ways, and have perpetrated horrors such as persecution, war, and genocide on other people and cultures. C: Therefore, we should avoid dogmatism and be non-dogmatic relativists. Objections to Argument 1 Elizabeth: It doesn’t follow that absolutists have done harm because they’re absolutists; they might have done the bad things for different reasons. Anita: “Harm” has no objective meaning in the first place if Peter is right. Elizabeth: Non-dogmatic relativism isn’t the only alternative to absolutism. Argument 2 P1: Scientific generalizations are inevitably hasty because scientists can’t possibly test enough cases (37). C: Therefore, scientific theories are underdetermined by the evidence. C: Therefore, scientific discourse is not “privileged”, so we should embrace non-dogmatic relativism. Objections to Argument 2 1. The argument is a straw man: scientists don’t say their conclusions are certain. 2. Confidence in science is justified not by the inductive arguments but by successive failures of reasonable attempts to disprove its claims. 3. Even if it’s true that scientific theories are underdetermined, it doesn’t follow that all our beliefs are therefore equally reasonable. (46) Argument 3 P1: Science depends on the notion of neutral sense data evidence. P2: But there is no such thing as “neutral” evidence of the senses. Perception itself is determined by expectation, hope, attention, etc. C: Therefore, scientific theories are underdetermined by the “evidence”. C: Therefore, scientific discourse is not “privileged”, so we should embrace non-dogmatic relativism. Argument 4 P1: Scientific theories and observations (the “evidence”) are expressed in language, which scientists believe can be neutral and purely descriptive. P2: But there is no such thing as neutral and purely descriptive language. C: Therefore, scientific theories are underdetermined by the “evidence”. C: Therefore, scientific discourse is not “privileged”, so we should embrace non-dogmatic relativism. Sub-Argument for P2: P1: All language embodies interpretation, and any interpretation is possible. Language constructs expectations, which form perception. “Seeing is seeing as.” “Believing is seeing.” P2: Furthermore, different languages slice up the world differently, as shown by e.g., W. V. O. Quine. C: Therefore, there is no such thing as neutral and purely descriptive language. Objections to Arguments 3 and 4 1. Some interpretations of perception are more natural than others. (45) 2. The interpretative options are finite; we just can’t see anything as anything. 3. Language is only one factor that determines our world; the world determines our world too. 4. Some linguistic behavior is common to all cultures and languages.
Argument 5 (illustrated by the theological debate of Sam and Mike, p. 32 f) P1: What counts as rational only counts as rational for some person or some culture. All rationality is “intra-rationality”. (36 f) P2: There is no “view from nowhere” in terms of which intra-rationally justified beliefs of different persons or cultures can be extra-rationally compared and rank-ordered. C: Therefore, the rules governing what counts as a reasonable explanation or reason can’t be justified rationally. Objections to Argument 5
Other General Arguments against Relativism:
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